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CodeTracked since May 19, 2026

Add workspace-bound checks to platform resource APIs

The PR introduces workspace-scoped authorization for platform issue, project, and agent operations by validating `workspace_id` on `get`, `update`, and `delete` flows, which blocks cross-tenant requests that previously could pass through with broader scope.

workspace_idissue serviceproject serviceagent service

What Happened

  • The PR introduces workspace-scoped authorization for platform issue, project, and agent operations by validating `workspace_id` on `get`, `update`, and `delete` flows, which blocks cross-tenant requests that previously could pass through with broader scope.
  • The PR introduces workspace-scoped authorization for platform issue, project, and agent operations by validating `workspace_id` on `get`, `update`, and `delete` flows, which blocks cross-tenant requests that previously could pass through with broader scope.
  • 1 evidence item attached for review.

What is Different

Before

Scattered source updates, isolated context, and manual follow-up across multiple feeds.

Now

Implemented explicit tenant-bound checks in core platform resource endpoints so operations are constrained to the caller’s workspace context, preventing cross-workspace manipulation; this is a concrete security-control fix rather than a refactor or config-only change.

Why Track This

Why It Matters

Platform operators and workspace admins in multi-tenant deployments can now prevent unauthorized cross-tenant reads or updates to issues, projects, and agents, so one tenant’s actions are less likely to leak or alter another tenant’s data before execution reaches write path. The code enforces workspace_id validation in `get`/`update`/`delete` paths and test coverage was added, so watch for integrations that send missing or stale workspace IDs, and monitor error-rate or permission-denied regressions during rollout.

Impact

Platform operators and workspace admins in multi-tenant deployments can now prevent unauthorized cross-tenant reads or updates to issues, projects, and agents, so one tenant’s actions are less likely to leak or alter another tenant’s data before execution reaches write path. The code enforces workspace_id validation in `get`/`update`/`delete` paths and test coverage was added, so watch for integrations that send missing or stale workspace IDs, and monitor error-rate or permission-denied regressions during rollout.

What To Watch Next

  • Watch whether workspace_id becomes a repeated pattern.
  • Track follow-up changes around AI Security.
  • Compare future signals against this evidence trail.
  • Re-check risk flags: stale_or_missing_workspace_id_errors, existing_clients_assuming_global_ids.
Open Topic TimelineOpen Technical EventOpen Original Sourcestale_or_missing_workspace_id_errors / existing_clients_assuming_global_ids / cross_tenant_workflow_regressions

Supporting Evidence

GITHUB PULL REQUESTHigh Trust

MervinPraison/PraisonAI PR #1686: refactor: security batch 3 — platform service scoping (do not auto-merge)

Platform services now accept workspace-aware IDs for issue/project/agent operations and reject cross-tenant IDs, with tests added for workspace scoping behavior.